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We have found modest effects of widowhood events on loss of health insurance. There are also 
modest effects of widowhood on labor supply, which we have not as yet attempted to attribute to 
insurance demand. Even new widowhood events, however, are not random with respect to initial 
conditions. Both initial health insurance status and risk of future widowhood are related to basic 
characteristics observed when married at baseline. When these confounding variables are 
controlled for in models of the effect of widowhood events on uninsurance, there is no longer 
statistical evidence of an independent effect of husband’s death on risk of losing insurance. 
Part of the reason why the measured independent effect of widowhood appears small is that there 
are events within marriage that can also affect insurance coverage, such as retirement or health 
events. Even though the number of uninsured women whose lack of coverage can be attributed to 
widowhood is therefore small, and not a distinct major policy motive for changes in age of 
eligibility for Medicare, uninsurance rates overall among the near elderly, and the potential public 
burden of cost-shifting from years just before 65 to years just after gaining Medicare coverage, 
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INTRODUCTION 
The age of eligibility for Medicare has been the topic of policy discussion from two 
perspectives.  Policy-makers concerned with the uninsured near-elderly have advanced 
policies to lower the age of eligibility, mainly through subsidized buy-in rights.  Others, 
noting the cost of the program and the scheduled increase in the normal retirement age 
for Social Security, have proposed raising the age of eligibility to 67, as Social Security 
will do, or even higher.  
 
In this paper, we examine the risk of uninsurance for divorced and widowed women, an 
important and vulnerable population among the elderly and near-elderly for whom 
Medicare eligibility policy might have substantial effects.  Previous work has shown 
widowhood to be associated with declining income and wealth and increasing poverty, 
with little compensating increase in labor force participation (Weir, Willis, and Sevak, 
2002).    
 
The predominance of employer-provided health insurance for the under-65 population, 
combined with the significant number of married women over 50 who rely on their 
husband’s health insurance for their own coverage, creates a large population of women 
potentially vulnerable to loss of coverage in the event of divorce or a husband’s death.  
The incomplete coverage of both men and women in the 50-64 age group implies that, for 
some couples, the illness and medical expenditures that precede a death can have a 
substantial negative impact on the financial security of a widow.  The risk of husband’s 
death in this age group is not trivial: at current mortality rates, approximately one out of 
every six males who reaches age 50 will not live to his sixty-fifth birthday.   2
  
Distinguishing between absence of coverage while married and inability to continue 
coverage after widowhood is important for two reasons.  First, it separates the negative 
impact of husband’s death into effects associated with the husband’s medical care and 
effects associated with subsequent needs by the widow.  More importantly, they are 
affected very differently by potential policies.  An expansion of COBRA rights, 
especially if augmented by some form of subsidy to employers or survivors to reduce the 
cost, might be effective at eliminating problems due to loss of dependent coverage, but 
would have no impact when the married couple had no health insurance to begin with.  





In previous work (Weir, Willis, and Sevak, 2000), we have demonstrated that women 
widowed between 50 and 65 are much more likely to fall into poverty after a husband’s 
death, and to be at much greater risk of poverty at older ages than are other women the 
same age who were widowed later.   At least some of this appears predictable from the 
financial and insurance position of couples before retirement (Weir and Willis, 1997; 
Weir and Willis, 2000). Whether this arises from lack of foresight, or preferences across 
future states, is not easily determined.  It does raise questions about what role health 
insurance and/or medical expenditures might play in the impact of loss of spouse on 




This study will utilize the original Health and Retirement Study (HRS) cohorts, born 
1931-41 and interviewed in 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000.  The HRS is a nationally 
representative sample with over-samples of African-Americans and Hispanics.  This 
group, originally about 12,500 persons aged 51-61 in 1992 are now aged 59-69.  The 
cumulative experience provides eight years of longitudinal data for individuals and on a 
synthetic cohort basis spans eighteen years from 51 to 69.  Beginning in 1998, the 
original HRS cohorts were combined with older cohorts from the AHEAD study, and two 
new cohorts to make it a complete sample of the population over age 50.  The combined 
study is also known as HRS.  We do not intend to use the other cohorts in this study, so 
HRS in this context refers only to the original HRS cohorts. 
 
Several features of the HRS make it especially well-suited to the needs of this project.  
The sample design targeted individuals in the age range 51-61, but included spouses or 
partners of the sampled individuals and asked many questions about the household’s 
resources.  For each individual at each interview date the HRS determines the source of 
health insurance (employer, Medicare, Medicaid, CHAMPUS, private-pay) and whether 
this coverage is provided directly to the individual or indirectly through a spouse’s 
eligibility.  The study also tracks many of the important determinants of health insurance 
coverage: employment, income, and health status.  
   4
There are, however, several major limitations of the HRS for the study of insurance 
choices.  The study does not attempt to measure the offer prices and benefits of policies 
available to respondents other than the one chosen because of the burden such questions 
would place on respondents in both interview length and cognitive demand.  Early 
attempts to survey employers about health insurance options, in the same way HRS 
surveys employers about pension plans, were not successful. 
 
Methods 
  The primary purpose of this study is to measure the importance of inadequate 
health insurance coverage and vulnerability to loss of coverage in determining the status 
of widows.  The main methodological concern is to not over or understate these effects 
by failing to control for the joint influence of other underlying characteristics on both 
health insurance status and widows’ well-being (see McClellan, 1998 for similar 
concerns).  Thus, we begin by trying to understand the determinants of initial health 
insurance status at baseline, and of the risks of a husband’s death, to determine which 
variables are possible confounders of the relationship between health insurance, change 
in insurance after widowhood, and well-being of widows. Some plausible candidates are 
education, employment history, health status, and income. 
 
There are no obvious natural experiments from which to estimate behavioral responses to 
policy changes involving Medicare eligibility and premium costs.  Rather, we will focus 
on identifying what proportion of widows might consider taking it up (those who have no 
coverage to begin with, or become uninsured after losing dependent coverage, or buy   5
private or continuation coverage at expensive premia).  Within a range that allows for 
individual choices to differ, we can assess how many might benefit from expanded 
eligibility and how much they would benefit.  To assess the impact of delaying the age of 
Medicare eligibility, we will look at three effects: the additional number of men who will 
die without insurance coverage between 65 and 67, the additional number of women who 
will lose dependent coverage by widowhood, and the additional amount of uninsured 
medical expenses that would be incurred by women widowed before age 65 if their entry 
into Medicare was delayed two additional years.  There are, of course, numerous second-
order effects that might be explored in future work, such as the impact of loss of coverage 




Cross-Sectional Patterns of Insurance Coverage by Marital Status 
 
Table 1a shows type of insurance coverage by marital status in the HRS panel.  It is based 
on pooling all five available waves for the 3,690 women who were age-eligible (51-61) in 
1992.   Uninsurance rates for widows are nearly double those of married women. 
Divorced and never-married women are more likely to be uninsured than married, but 
less so than widows. Non-married women are much less likely to have employer-based 
coverage and more likely to have public insurance, including Medicare (even though the 
sample is restricted to the under-65).  Table 1b shows, for the same data, the distribution 
by marital status of each insurance type.  Twenty percent of the uninsured near-elderly   6
women are widows, and 16% divorcees, even though they only make up 26% of the 
overall population.  
 
For the purpose of comparison, Tables 2a and 2b repeat the same format using the MEPS 
cross-section data for 1998.  The data have been re-weighted to match the age 
distribution in the pooled HRS dataset used in Table 1.  Uninsurance rates are slightly 
higher in the MEPS sample, and more equal between the widowed and divorced women.  
The MEPS sample also has a higher proportion of divorced women relative to widows.  
Combined, those two distinctions result in a reversal of the relative importance of widows 
and divorcees in the uninsured, with the divorced being more important in MEPS and 
widows in HRS. 
 
Marital status is clearly associated with health insurance coverage.  Compared with its 
importance for poverty differentials, however, the association is rather mild.  If all 
women had the coverage rates of married women, the overall uninsurance rate for the 55-




The primary goal of this project is to use longitudinal data available in HRS.   Table 3 
summarizes the number of marital transitions available in four transition periods 
consisting of five interview waves and eight years of observation.  The sample consists of 
women who were age-eligible (age 51-61) and married in 1992, and who were   7
interviewed continuously through 2000.  We exclude observations in which the woman 
reached age 65 or over, because we want to focus on health insurance coverage before 
age-based eligibility for Medicare.  The initial sample of 2,525 married women in 1992 
produced a total of 8,604 transitions (including non-movement) over 17,208 person-years 
of observation.  Of these, 238 were new widowhood events, and 46 were new divorces.  
Of the divorcees, 10 reported being separated in at least one interview before reporting 
themselves as divorced.  
 
The small number of divorces limits the statistical analyses that can be undertaken, but it 
is not out of line with expectations based on annual divorce rates of approximately 4 per 
thousand married in the 55-64 age group.  The HRS panel is not a small sample, and it is 
unlikely that any random household sampling study will produce large numbers of new 
divorce observations in this age group.  Further study of the health insurance effects of 
divorce in the near elderly may need to use targeted samples or administrative data. 
 
Health Insurance Transitions by Marital Status Transitions 
Table 4 provides basic descriptive results on how health insurance transitions vary by 
marital status transitions.  Age-eligible women who were not married in 1992 are 
included here to provide a comparison of continuing divorced or widowed women with 
the newly divorced or widowed.  Turning first to the initial insurance status of each 
group, we see that while married women who become divorced have very similar initial 
coverage rates as women who remain married, those who become widowed have 
substantially lower rates while still married.  A likely explanation is that husbands with   8
higher mortality risk are less likely to provide coverage for their spouse.  This will be 
examined in more detail below. Women who are already divorced or widowed in the 
baseline interview have lower coverage rates than married women who become divorced 
or widowed. 
 
Looking at the rates of insurance loss, there is a great disparity between divorce and 
widowhood.  Newly divorced women are actually (insignificantly) less likely to lose 
insurance than women who stay married.  New widows are more likely to lose insurance 
than women who stay married and also compared with women who have already been 
widowed. Widowhood thus seems a more important cause of uninsurance than divorce, 
perhaps because women who divorce are better prepared to be alone (whatever the 
causality between preparation and risk).  
The loss of insurance by the insured is only part of the story.  Table 4 also shows that 
there is considerable movement out of uninsurance in all marital status combinations.  
Surprisingly, this is even higher for new marital dissolutions than for continuing ones.  
Uninsured married women who become widowed have a 47% chance of gaining 
insurance, compared with 43% for those who remain married, and 36% for uninsured 
widows who remain widowed.  Uninsured married women who become divorced have a 
60% chance of gaining insurance, versus 47% for divorced women who remain divorced. 
 
Uninsurance Rates by Time Relative to Marital Transitions 
Overall, the rates of gaining and losing insurance, coupled with the initial coverage rates, 
imply relative stability in coverage rates for those who stay married as well as for new   9
marital dissolutions.  This pattern can be seen more clearly in Figure 1, which shows 
uninsurance rates over time for new marital dissolutions.  Data have been pooled and 
centered on the dissolution event, which occurs between time –1 (last interview in 
married state) and time 0 (first interview after marriage ended).  There is very little 
change in overall coverage rates immediately following the end of a marriage.  Widows 
had higher uninsurance rates in marriage than did divorcees (see also Table 4), and the 
gap persisted after the dissolution.  
 
That might be attributable to continuation coverage options (COBRA) in some family 
insurance plans (Gruber and Madrian, 1996).  Most expire after 3 years,  so we might 
expect to see a delayed response.  In waves following the dissolution widows tended to 
improve their coverage situation, while for divorced women it got worse.  Four years 
after the first report of dissolution, the coverage rates for the two groups were quite 
similar.  Future work might explore whether divorced women are more vulnerable to 
expiration of continuation coverage. 
 
Determinants of Health Insurance Type at Baseline 
Before beginning the analysis of longitudinal transitions in marital status and health 
insurance coverage, we examine the determinants of health insurance status at baseline in 
1992 to better understand initial conditions.  This is done in Table 5 by means of a 
multinomial logit model across four insurance categories: uninsured (the omitted 
category), employer coverage, other private coverage, and public coverage. We exclude 
women who were covered by Medicare in 1992, so public coverage is essentially   10
Medicaid.  The coefficients of the multinomial logit model indicate the effect of a given 
right-hand-side variable on the likelihood of having a given insurance coverage relative 
to having no coverage.  Therefore, if coefficients are similar across columns that variable 
raises odds of all types of insurance more or less equally.  Big differences across columns 
indicate that the variable affects one type of coverage differently than another.  The 
estimated relationships cannot be interpreted as causal.  We don’t observe the relative 
prices of insurance plans and don’t observe the complete past history. 
 
Age raises the odds of employer or other private insurance, but there is little impact on 
public relative to no insurance (the sample is limited to ages 51-61, and Medicare 
beneficiaries are excluded).  Relative to whites, African-Americans have higher odds of 
being covered by public insurance and lower odds of privately purchased insurance. 
Hispanics have lower odds of both employer and  other private insurance. 
  
Less education lowers the odds of all types of insurance relative to having no insurance.  
however, more education has little effect.  Poor health raises the odds of public insurance, 
but has little effect on private or employer coverage relative to none.  This is what one 
would expect if Medicaid participation were driven by need and not just eligibility rules.  
Excellent health, like higher education, has little effect.  Not surprisingly, employment 
raises the odds of employer coverage, while actually lowering the odds of public 
coverage relative to uninsurance.  Log income raises the odds of all insurance types, but 
especially employer coverage—no doubt an endogenous effect of employment raising 
both income and employer coverage.  Having an income below 125% of poverty (a proxy   11
for Medicaid eligibility) does raise the odds of public coverage relative to no insurance, 
and greatly lowers the odds of employer coverage. 
 
Recent work has shown that there is substitution at the margin between insurance benefits 
and wages for married women, with earnings about 20% higher for women with no 
insurance from their job in CPS (Olson, 2002), and wages about 7% higher in the HRS 
(Liang, 2000).  Thus, some women with good coverage from a spouse may choose jobs 
without health insurance.  In our data, being married to a man who does not himself have 
employer-based coverage does not alter the odds of insurance much relative to not being 
married at all.  Being married to a husband with employer coverage raises the odds of the 
wife’s employer coverage (which includes employer-based coverage through spouse), 
and lowers the odds of public insurance.  As anticipated, most of the effect of marital 
status on insurance seems to operate through husband’s access to employer coverage, 
although that may also proxy for other characteristics that affect insurance demand or 
offers. 
 
To highlight the distinction between employer coverage through husband and employer 
coverage on own job, we re-estimated the multinomial logit splitting employer coverage 
between those two types (ties went to the wife).  Table 5b shows that there are some 
important differences between the two sources of coverage.  Some variables, such as age, 
education, health, and income affect the two in similar directions and with generally 
similar-sized effects.  The big differences are for work status and husband’s coverage 
status.  Women who work are more likely to have their own coverage, and less likely to   12
have coverage through spouse, all else equal.  Women whose husbands have employer 
coverage are, of course, vastly more likely to have coverage through a husband’s 
employer than single women.  More interestingly, they are also more likely to have 
coverage through their own employer.  Similarly, women whose husbands do not have 
employer coverage are less likely to have insurance from their own employer than are 
single women.  There appear to be household-level effects missing from the model that 
affect the chances of own-employer coverage for both spouses. 
 
Risk of Widowhood and Initial Health Insurance Coverage 
 
A second source of confounding in the relationship between marital transitions and health 
insurance is correlation between the determinants of husband’s mortality and the wife’s 
initial health insurance.  For example, we saw earlier that newly widowed women had 
higher uninsurance rates while married than other married women.  In Table 6, we look at 
models of the determinants of husband’s death.  All households are observed throughout 
the eight-year period, so we model this simply as a logit regression of the probability of 
dying anytime between 1992 and 2000. 
 
In the first panel of the table, we isolate the relationship between wife’s insurance 
coverage type and her husband’s mortality.  We have no theoretical reason to expect a 
direct effect from wife’s coverage to husband’s risk of death, so any observed correlation 
can be attributed to omitted (including unobservable) variables.  The first panel shows 
that a wife with employer coverage is significantly less likely to become widowed than   13
either a wife with no insurance (the reference coverage category), or wives with public or 
other private coverage.  It is primarily through employer coverage, then, that the higher 
risk of widowhood for uninsured wives is produced. 
 
In the second panel, we add characteristics of the wife and the household, but none 
specific to the husband.  The magnitude of the employer coverage effect is reduced, but 
remains significant.  The relationship between initial coverage and risk of widowhood is 
therefore not simply due to basic characteristics of the wife that might be correlated with 
both.  In the third panel, we include characteristics of the husband only.  In this model, 
the correlation of wife’s coverage and husband’s risk of dying is reduced to 
insignificance.  The main variables that account for this are age, husband’s work status 
and health.  Age is highly related to mortality, and may influence offers of health 
insurance.  This is even more true of health status because a man’s work status will be 
affected by his health, and that will in turn affect insurance offers. The coefficient on 
health status must also be interpreted in light of the coefficient on husband having 
employer coverage, which independently but not significantly lowers mortality risk. 
Together the imply that working men with no employer coverage have lower mortality 
risks than non-working men, but men with employer coverage do slightly better.   
 
 
LONGITUDINAL ANALYSES OF EFFECTS OF WIDOWHOOD 
   14
Widowhood and Health Insurance Transitions 
 
Now we turn to estimates of the effects of widowhood on health insurance transitions. 
We wish to model transitions from insured into uninsurance, as that is the object of 
greatest policy interest.  To do this we estimate a hazard model of the risks of first report 
of uninsurance.  We therefore exclude from the panel all waves of data for any woman 
who was either not married or not insured in 1992.  All subsequent observations of 
widowhood are therefore new events within the panel, as are observations of uninsurance. 
 
Table 7 reports estimates for five variants of the model.  In the first model, widowhood 
alone increases the risk of becoming uninsured, compared with remaining married.  The 
effect is substantial and significant.  As we have already indicated, however, it is also 
likely to be correlated with other characteristics that affect insurance coverage.  We are 
also interested in whether the mechanism for widowhood’s effect is primarily through the 
loss of coverage by spouse.  Because that is clearly endogenous, we would prefer to use 
whether or not the husband’s employer offered coverage for the wife.  That is not 
available in the early waves of HRS.  Instead, we use a variable indicating whether the 
spouse had coverage in the previous wave (last wave alive for widows) as a proxy for 
access to insurance through spouse.   A husband who had insurance the previous wave 
greatly lowers the risk of a woman becoming uninsured. The magnitude of the widow 
effect went down considerably because, as we saw previously, the risk of widowhood is 
lower for women whose husbands have coverage. In the third panel, we seek to test 
whether widowhood works through the loss of husband’s coverage by adding an   15
interaction term that takes on the value 1 when the woman is a widow and her husband 
had coverage before his death.  The coefficient on the interaction term is poorly estimated 
due to the small number of observations.  It is not very large either, and does not much 
affect the coefficients on the main effect terms. 
 
In the fourth and fifth panels, we add variables related to insurance status.  The most 
prominent in panel four are having less than a high school education, being African-
American, and having income below 125% of the poverty line (which adjusts for family 
size).  These three variables raise the risk of becoming uninsured.  The coefficient on the 
main effect of widowhood is considerably reduced and becomes statistically 
insignificant.  Thus, most of the effect of widowhood can be accounted for by a relatively 
small number of observed variables.  The fifth panel adds health terms.  Although these 
are difficult to interpret because they could be outcomes of change in insurance status, we 
find health problems are associated with higher risks of uninsurance.  This is compatible 
with McClellan (1998), who found that new health events raised the risk of uninsurance. 
It is not clear from work using HRS whether that is due to changes in health insurance 
offers, or to changes in take-up rates conditional on prices and benefits offered. 
 
 Labor Supply Response to Widowhood 
 
One response to the economic loss associated with death of a spouse is to increase labor 
supply, which could be partially motivated by the desire to obtain employer-provided 
health insurance. In terms of the participation decision alone, this could take two forms:   16
re-entry into the labor force after widowhood, or delaying retirement by continuing to 
work longer than would have been the case in the absence of a husband’s death. 
 
In Table 8 we show the results of a logit estimate of labor force participation based on the 
pooled sample.  The data are limited to women who were married in 1992 and under 65 
at the time of the interview. To test the effects of widowhood on labor force participation, 
we create a four-way categorization based on prior wave labor force participation and 
current wave marital status (widowed or not).  The excluded category is women who are 
married and did not work the previous wave.  The effect of widowhood on re-entry is 
directly estimated by the coefficient on the category of widowed who did not work the 
previous wave.  Compared with non-working women who stayed married, formerly non-
working widows had a statistically significant higher probability of re-entering the labor 
force. There is, then, evidence that widowhood induces re-entry into the labor force. 
 
The test of whether widowhood promotes delayed retirement is the difference between 
widows who worked last wave and married women who worked last wave.  For 
convenience, we ran the model a second time, using as the excluded category married 
women who worked last wave.  The coefficient on widows who worked last wave is 
positive, but smaller than the effect on re-entry and not statistically significant. The effect 
is in the expected direction but it would take a larger sample to find significance for an 
effect of this size. 
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The other variables in the model are familiar determinants of labor supply.  They are 
needed as controls for differences between widows and married women that might bias 
the coefficients on the marital/work status categories.  Age is of course an important 
determinant of work in the near-elderly population and is also a useful metric for 
evaluating the scale of other coefficients.  The widowhood effect on re-entry into the 
workforce, for example, is equivalent to being three to four years younger.  Hispanics 
have higher labor force participation, but there is no difference between whites and 
African-Americans.  
 
Education has no net effect, which might seem surprising.  There are several possible 
explanations.  One is that women’s education is also correlated with husband’s earnings, 
and that makes her participation less likely. Another is that some of the pathways through 
which education affects labor supply are controlled for by other variables.  Poor health 
and disability both have strong negative effects on labor supply, and there is a well-
known strong correlation between education and health that is not always accounted for 
in labor supply studies.  Our model also controls for work history prior to 1992 with a 
variable indicating if the woman has worked less than five years total up to that time.  
Education’s effect on lifetime labor supply is to some extent controlled for with this 
variable, which would reduce the overall effect. 
 
 




We have found modest effects of widowhood events on loss of health insurance. There 
are also modest effects of widowhood on labor supply, which we have not as yet 
attempted to attribute to insurance demand.  Even new widowhood events, however, are 
not random with respect to initial conditions. Both initial health insurance status and risk 
of future widowhood are related to basic characteristics observed when married at 
baseline. When these confounding variables are controlled for in models of the effect of 
widowhood events on uninsurance, there is no longer statistical evidence of an 
independent effect of husband’s death on risk of losing insurance. 
 
Part of the reason why the measured independent effect of widowhood appears small is 
that there are events within marriage that can also affect insurance coverage, such as 
retirement or health events.  Even though the number of uninsured women whose lack of 
coverage can be attributed to widowhood is therefore small, and not a distinct major 
policy motive for changes in age of eligibility for Medicare, uninsurance rates overall 
among the near elderly, and the potential public burden of cost-shifting from years just 
before 65 to years just after gaining Medicare coverage, suggest that Medicare eligibility 
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TABLE 1.  Health Insurance by Marital Status in the HRS Panel 
 
 
1a. HRS Health Insurance Coverage Distribution by Marital Status
Married Widowed Divorced Separated
Never 
Married Total
Current Health Insurance Coverage
Medicare 4.1 12.0 9.0 9.6 9.8 6.1
Employer Provided 72.8 44.9 57.2 38.0 55.8 65.8
Privately Purchased 9.5 12.3 8.7 4.6 7.5 9.5
Medicaid or Champus 1.3 6.3 8.1 24.2 9.5 3.7
Uninsured 12.4 24.6 17.0 23.7 17.4 15.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sample Size 10,589 2,139 2,310 456 669 16,163
Current Marital Status
1b. HRS Marital Status Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage Categories
Married Widowed Divorced Separated
Never 
Married Total 
Current Health Insurance Coverage Sample Size
Medicare 3,206 45.4 24.4 20.7 3.5 6.1 100
Employer Provided 10,360 75.0 8.5 12.1 1.3 3.2 100
Privately Purchased 1,466 67.4 16.0 12.6 1.1 3.0 100
Medicaid or Champus 733 23.7 21.3 30.7 14.6 9.7 100
Uninsured 2,685 56.1 20.3 15.7 3.5 4.4 100
Total 18,450 67.8 12.4 13.9 2.2 3.8 100
Note: These include only those under age 65.
Current Marital Status  21




2a. MEPS Health Insurance Coverage Distribution by Marital Status
Married Widowed Divorced Separated
Never 
Married Total
Current Health Insurance Coverage
Medicare 3.2 11.7 9.8 15.1 14.7 6.1
Private 77.9 60.7 64.0 49.0 57.4 72.0
Other Public 4.8 5.8 4.5 14.1 8.5 5.3
Uninsured 14.1 21.7 21.7 21.9 19.4 16.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sample Size 1140 181 288 48 109 1766
Current Marital Status
2b. MEPS Marital Status Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage Categories
Married Widowed Divorced Separated
Never 
Married Total
Current Health Insurance Coverage Sample Size
Medicare 109 34.1 22.6 25.5 5.0 12.7 100
Private 1231 70.2 10.0 14.2 1.4 4.3 100
Other Public 111 59.2 13.2 13.6 5.4 8.7 100
Uninsured 315 54.8 15.5 20.8 2.7 6.2 100
Total 1766 64.9 11.8 16.0 2.0 5.3 100
Current Marital Status  22





Note: Pooled sample of four inter-wave periods of observation, 1992 to 2000. 
Sample restricted to women who were married and age-eligible in 1992 and under 






Stayed Married 7,892 22,049,989 92.49
Divorced 36 100,981 0.42
Widowed 238 591,147 2.48
Separated to Married 10 21,300 0.09
Separated to Divorced 10 29,144 0.12
Separated to Widowed 1 1,032 0.00
Stayed Divorced 65 182,241 0.76
Stayed Widowed 257 644,591 2.70
Remarried 14 37,957 0.16
Other 81 182,847 0.77
Total 8,604 23,841,229 100.00  23











Percent Insured in 
Beginning Wave





Stayed Married 93.1% 72.8% 89.4% 4.8% 43.0%
Married to Divorced 0.6% 0.4% 89.6% 3.4% 60.6%
Married to Widowed 2.3% 1.8% 79.3% 12.0% 46.7%
Stayed Divorced 1.0% 0.8% 89.1% 9.5% 80.6%
Stayed Widowed 2.4% 1.9% 84.1% 3.2% 36.7%
Remarried 0.2% 0.1% 94.3% 16.9% 0.0%
Other 0.6% 0.4% 80.6% 9.8% 28.0%
Note: Includes only individuals who never received Medicare before age 65, those under age 65 and who were married in 1992.  Individuals who 
report separated in one wave but later specify married or divorce are classified by their final status instead of separated.  24
TABLE 5. Determinants of Health Insurance Coverage at Baseline (t-statistics below coefficients) 
Public Plan Employer Plan Private Plan
Age in 1992 0.023 0.056 0.082
0.89 3.12 3.28
Black   0.415 0.231 -0.590
2.01 1.53 -2.38
Hispanic -0.078 -0.618 -1.333
-0.31 -3.14 -3.76
Less than high school -0.284 -0.690 -0.861
-1.38 -4.84 -4.08
More than high school -0.025 0.211 0.140
-0.10 1.45 0.73
Working for pay in 1992 -1.488 1.534 -0.022
-6.97 11.17 -0.13
Self-Rated Health in 1992: Excellent or very good 0.004 -0.116 0.119
0.02 -0.84 0.62
Self-Rated Health in 1992: Fair or poor 0.632 -0.132 -0.184
2.85 -0.80 -0.76
Log 1992 household income 0.145 0.651 0.158
1.41 7.87 1.57
Income less than 125% of poverty threshold 0.475 -0.954 -0.286
2.21 -5.10 -1.12
Married, Spouse has Employer Insurance in 1992 -1.303 2.983 -0.444
-2.76 13.77 -1.03
Married, Spouse does not have Employer Insurance in 1992 -0.57 -0.47 0.74
-2.88 -3.45 3.91
Constant -3.407 -9.517 -6.903
-1.82 -7.03 -3.90
*Excludes those covered by Medicare in 1992  25





Employer Plan Private Plan
Age in 1992 0.024 0.069 0.052 0.090
0.89 3.70 2.11 3.59
Black   0.421 0.342 -0.217 -0.573
2.04 2.17 -0.95 -2.30
Hispanic -0.070 -0.473 -1.151 -1.307
-0.28 -2.29 -3.77 -3.67
Less than high school -0.268 -0.747 -0.549 -0.869
-1.30 -4.95 -2.58 -4.11
More than high school 0.028 0.282 0.114 0.176
0.11 1.87 0.60 0.90
Working for pay in 1992 -1.437 2.053 -0.376 0.049
-6.73 13.96 -2.01 0.29
Self-Rated Health in 1992: Excellent or very good -0.014 -0.107 -0.128 0.127
-0.06 -0.75 -0.69 0.66
Self-Rated Health in 1992: Fair or poor 0.647 -0.072 -0.021 -0.153
2.91 -0.41 -0.09 -0.63
Log 1992 household income 0.147 0.763 0.391 0.178
1.42 8.65 3.22 1.76
Income less than 125% of poverty threshold 0.481 -1.074 -0.787 -0.291
2.23 -5.16 -2.21 -1.14
Married, Spouse has Employer Insurance in 1992 -0.880 0.593 5.745 -0.586
-1.85 2.65 16.51 -1.36
Married, Spouse does not have Employer Insurance in 1992 -0.562 -0.615 0.415 0.692
-2.82 -4.29 1.16 3.64
Constant -3.493 -11.786 -8.794 -7.568
-1.86 -8.24 -4.57 -4.23
*Excludes those covered by Medicare in 1992  26





Wife has Public plan 0.331 0.318 0.320 0.380
1.11 1.00 0.97 1.14
Wife has Employer plan -0.641 -0.414 -0.178 -0.257
-3.61 -1.97 -0.70 -0.93
Wife has Private plan 0.116 0.068 0.130 0.005
0.45 0.24 0.43 0.01






Less than high school education -0.009 -0.062
-0.05 -0.30
More than high school education -0.087 0.142
-0.53 0.77
Working for pay in 1992 -0.078 -0.161
-0.53 -0.99
Self-rated health 1992: Excellent or very good 0.057 0.195
0.36 1.14
Self-rated health 1992: Fair or poor -0.073 -0.317
-0.36 -1.45
Household Characteristics
Log 1992 household income -0.387 -0.006
-3.55 -0.05
Income less than 125% of poverty threshold 0.019 -0.123
0.07 -0.42
Husband's Characteristics
Husband has employer insurance in 1992 -0.210 -0.234
-1.17 -1.26
Husband's Age in 1992 0.062 0.065
4.70 4.27
Husband black 0.079 -1.835
0.36 -2.81
Husband hispanic -0.985 -0.500
-2.91 -0.89
Husband less than high school -0.086 -0.021
-0.47 -0.11
Husband more than high school -0.353 -0.431
-2.00 -2.28
Husband working for pay in 1992 -0.717 -0.716
-4.53 -4.37
Husband's self-rated health 1992: Excellent or very good -0.616 -0.662
-3.27 -3.48
Husband's self-rated health 1992: Fair or poor 1.102 1.163
6.23 6.45
Constant -1.592 -1.509 -5.018 -4.720
-10.10 -0.89 -5.86 -2.54  27




Wife has Public plan 0.259 0.190 0.256 0.300
0.99 0.69 0.87 0.99
Wife has Own Employer plan -0.452 -0.159 -0.154 -0.240
-2.42 -0.74 -0.71 -1.02
Wife Covered by Husband's Employer -0.862 -0.634 -0.340 -0.438
-5.01 -3.28 -1.19 -2.06
Wife has Private plan 0.022 0.011 0.224 0.106
0.09 0.04 0.82 0.38






Less than high school education 0.015 -0.053
0.09 -0.28
More than high school education -0.130 0.126
-0.86 0.73
Working for pay in 92 -0.122 -0.101
-0.85 -0.65
Self-rated health 1992: Excellent or very good 0.010 0.123
0.07 0.76
Self-rated health 1992: Fair or poor -0.001 -0.253
0.00 -1.21
Household Characteristics
Log 1992 household income -0.308 0.011
-3.34 0.10
Income less than 125% of poverty threshold 0.113 -0.055
0.47 -0.21
Husband's Characteristics
Husband has employer insurance in 1992 -0.022
-0.09
Husband's Age in 1992 0.056 0.051
4.50 3.60
Husband black -0.017 -2.172
-0.08 -2.61
Husband hispanic -0.933 -0.345
-3.07 -0.66
Husband less than high school -0.025 0.035
-0.15 0.20
Husband more than high school -0.308 -0.374
-1.84 -2.09
Husband working for pay in 1992 -0.765 -0.781
-5.20 -5.18
Husband's self-rated health 1992: Excellent or very good -0.654 -0.702
-3.74 -3.96
Husband's self-rated health 1992: Fair or poor 0.997 1.051
6.10 6.32
Constant -1.592 -3.139 -4.574 -5.859
-10.13 -2.05 -5.74 -3.40  28
 
 







Widow 1.016 0.610 0.642 0.367 0.314
4.72 2.83 2.49 1.30 1.10
Husband had employer coverage in previous wave -0.589 -0.582 -0.566 -0.568
-5.10 -4.86 -4.42 -4.55








Less than high school education 0.445 0.340
2.95 2.20
More than high school education 0.020 0.069
0.15 0.52
Less than 5 years of work history -0.030 0.048
-0.24 0.26
Income less than 125% of poverty threshold 1.025 1.011
5.60 5.63
Self-rated health: Excellent or very good 0.033
0.23
Self-rated health: Fair or poor 0.506
2.86
One or more ADL difficulties 0.475
2.36
Constant -3.192 -2.544 -2.548 -3.750 -3.690
-55.79 -5.10 -28.41 -3.16 -3.26
Log-Likelihood -1546.97 -1417.87 -1416.1 -1409.42 -1349.85  29





Widowed, worked last wave 3.729
18.19
Widowed, did not work last wave 0.490
2.20








Less than high school education 0.028
0.30
More than high school education 0.094
1.30
Less than 5 years of work history -0.931
-6.75
Self-rated health:Excellent or very good 0.063
0.83
Self-rated health: Fair or poor -0.766
-7.28






































Divorced (All Insurance) Divorced (Excl. Medicaid)
Widowed (All Insurance) Widowed (Excl. Medicaid)